From Commanders to Campaigners (Part II)

Author’s Note: In December, I interviewed Robert Forsyth and Robert Green, who served for many years in the Belly of a Beast—the British naval nuclear war machine—they now devoutly wish to see dismantled. I’ve told their stories in a separate article and you can find my entire email exchange with them here. What follows is the abridged and edited (for length and Spectator style) version.

 

Happy Banniversary?

Sean Howard (SH): We are approaching (January 22) the second ‘banniversary’ of the entry-into-force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the ‘Ban Treaty’ you both support. How do you assess the success of the treaty in not only growing its membership—now up to 68, with 91 signatories—but changing the global debate over nuclear abolition?

Robert Forsyth (RF): The strong opposition by the P5—the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council—to the TPNW is proof they feel threatened by it. Additional signatures can only strengthen its political weight.

Robert Green (RG): The TPNW represents a new, determined diplomacy of resistance, fueled by frustration over the nuclear cartel modernizing their arsenals. The TPNW’s primary success has been to provide a more dynamic, humanitarian nuclear disarmament alternative to the sclerotic Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been abused by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to create and sustain a strategy of nuclear apartheid. The TPNW’s successful negotiation in July 2017 by 122 non-nuclear States, which I attended in the UN in New York, also strengthened the stigmatization of nuclear weapons and thus nuclear deterrence, bringing them closer to being seen as unacceptably inhumane and destructive weapons of mass destruction (WMD), far worse than already-banned chemical or biological weapons; and provided anti-nuclear campaigners with a new tool to raise public awareness and mobilize opposition to the NWS’ modernization of their arsenals.

Left to right: George Lee Butler, Robert McNamara and Robert Green,

Robert Green (right) with two fellow converts to the nuclear disarmament cause, Retired General George Lee Butler (left), former Commander of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (centre). (Photo taken November 1999; reproduced with permission of Robert Green.)

However, the TPNW has the following weaknesses: it is not universal, or comprehensive; it allows the NWS to join without first getting rid of their nuclear arsenals; Article 17 allows withdrawal if national security is threatened, thereby overriding the law; it excludes prohibiting transit and financing of nuclear weapons; there is no UN body to monitor compliance, unlike with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and it includes an inalienable right to develop nuclear electricity generation, which provides NWS with waste byproducts to make nuclear weapons, and propulsion for submarines.

The treaty will probably slowly increase its signatories and ratifications, but its weaknesses preclude it from having any serious impact on persuading the NWS to change their stance. So the struggle to achieve a universal, comprehensive and enforceable nuclear weapons convention, like the CWC, must continue.

 

“If Deterrence Fails”

SH: The recently declassified version of the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has been castigated by many analysts for failing to deliver on Biden’s campaign promise to declare that the ‘sole purpose’ of US nuclear weapons is to deter, prevent, or respond to a nuclear attack. And despite the formulaic insistence of the P5 that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” both Russia and the US/NATO seriously plan to ‘prevail ’ in nuclear combat. The NPR, for example, claims the use of nuclear weapons could help secure “US objectives if deterrence fails”—and in a way that somehow manages to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict, protecting civilians from deliberate attack or indiscriminate harm! So my supplementary question to you both, given your nuclear weapons training, is what on Earth are they talking about?

A nuclear-capable Royal Navy Lynx anti-submarine helicopter over London.


A nuclear-capable Royal Navy Lynx anti-submarine helicopter over London. (Reproduced with permission of Robert Green.)

RF: The change in Biden’s posture on deterrence is a sad reflection on pork barrel politics. He almost certainly was considering the fact that the Democrats rely heavily on funding and votes from the defense industrial sector and, with the midterm elections looming, he could not afford to lose these votes. The question about what to do if (nuclear) deterrence fails is a major subject in its own right. Here are a few observations:

  • To start with, one could argue that it has already failed in Ukraine. In the face of nuclear threats from Putin, NATO has been deterred from getting directly involved militarily for fear of instigating the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW); indeed, it has clearly signaled that the response to TNW would be the massive use of conventional force. This sits entirely at odds with the NPR’s suggestion that the US could conduct and win a tactical nuclear war, presupposing that Russia (or another adversary) would back down after the exchange of a few ‘low yield’ strikes. Far more likely is that it would continue to escalate to a level at which there are no winners—just a long nuclear winter for all.
  • I am constantly appalled by how the US, UK and France feel able to contemplate first use in circumstances where they believe they face an existential threat. Such a decision would have to be based on intelligence, a notoriously unreliable commodity. In doing this they lean, of course, on the ICJ’s failure to reach a majority opinion on whether or not the use of nuclear weapons in extremis is justifiable. A further specious argument is to suggest first use would not deliberately target civilians; a highly academic distinction.
Russian President Vladimir Putin

Russian President Vladimir Putin, September 2022. (Photo by Pavel Bednyakov, RIA Novosti)

  • Back in my Polaris days, I had personally to consider what to do if deterrence failed. Was there any point in carrying out a second, retaliatory strike if the Soviets launched one on NATO? We now know that the USSR never had such an intention but was prepared to react if NATO fired first. The biggest danger, therefore, was an accidental misread and consequent launch, and 13 such near misses were well documented by Chatham House in its 2014 report ‘Too Close for Comfort.’ Interestingly, a number of Polaris Commanding Officers (COs) made a very private personal decision that if deterrence failed then it was pointless to conduct a 2nd strike. Some decided to declare they could not fire at all, and their careers suffered accordingly.

RG: This absurd state of military affairs—preparing to prevail in a nuclear war the P5 acknowledge can never be won—demonstrates the futility of US attempts to square the circle of sustaining nuclear deterrence (primarily to achieve its quixotic pursuit of hegemonic security and control over its nuclear vassal allies) while simultaneously claiming compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Any attempts to formulate a sole purpose declaration, or even a No First Use agreement, amount to tinkering around the edges of this fundamental contradiction. In Security without Nuclear Deterrence I concluded that nuclear deterrence should simply be called out as State-sponsored nuclear terrorism.

In 1979, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma concluded in his last speech, which he emphasized was also his most important one: “I have never been able to accept the reasons for the belief that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorized in terms of their tactical or strategic purposes.” Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons to stop NATO interfering in his Ukraine operation is empty. This is because it would be a grotesque own goal for Putin to use even one so-called ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon there, inevitably prompting escalation by the US in reprisal, leaving a radioactive wasteland in one of the world’s key agricultural areas, a medical and refugee catastrophe, and denying Russian access to its vital warm water outlets along the Black Sea coast.

The key to progressing serious nuclear disarmament is to puncture the delusion of nuclear deterrence, exposing it as impractical, politically unsound and counterproductive to our real security needs, as well as immoral and illegal. And happily, there are alternative, non-nuclear strategies to deter war and secure just and lasting peace.

 

Britannia’s Trident

SH: Professor Paul Rogers recently remarked to me that in most of the UK “nuclear possession was and is seen as a necessary part of big-power status. Apparently being able to kill 20 million people in a couple of hours is a sign of great power status and not the posture of a rogue state.” Despite the vast cost of building four new nuclear-armed Dreadnought submarines, the spell cast by this ‘possession’ seems unbreakable. But might it not snap if ‘Global Britain’ found itself without Scotland, and if the Scottish National Party (SNP) honored its long-standing vow to ‘go non-nuclear,’ close the country’s Trident bases, and join TPNW?

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament protestors in Paisley Cross, Scotland July 2016.

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament protestors in Paisley Cross, Scotland, July 2016. (Photo by Paisley Scotland  from Paisley Scotland, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

RF: The Scottish breakaway regretfully is far from a given: (a) there are serious questions to be addressed on how to run an independent Scotland, not least the matter of currency, to convince even many SNP sympathizers; (b) unless Scots living in England are allowed to vote, the preponderance of English living in Scotland may well tip the vote against; (c) Westminster will have some punitive measures with which to threaten/influence swing voters. Nonetheless it serves the major purpose of keeping disarmament a live issue in the media.

RG: Putin has done us all a huge favor by invoking nuclear rhetoric, and we need to exploit it. This is particularly important in the UK, where the public have recently woken up to other examples of political incompetence on finance and the economy. In the run-up to the 18 July 2016 UK Parliamentary debate and consequent Government decision to proceed with the Trident submarine replacement, an opinion poll revealed that just 44% supported this (while 22% wanted the existing Trident force scrapped). A further survey in March 2017 showed 75% support for the UK to join the UN negotiations for a TPNW; and in Scotland support rose to 82%.

A regular feature of every general election is to challenge each potential prime minister whether they would “press the nuclear button.” This misleading taunt is deeply offensive to submarine COs who, since 1968, have been delegated this dreadful political responsibility by successive posturing political leaders. The reality is that this amounts to shameful abuse and mis-deployment of the Submarine Service, compounded by misdirection of dwindling defense budget money away from retaining sufficient usable attack submarines and other warships to fulfill the Royal Navy’s historical core role. This has reached the point where conventional maritime deterrence capability has been eroded to the extent that any major aggression against UK vital interests could quickly require threatening a nuclear response.

French anti-nuclear weapons protest, January 2022.

French anti-nuclear weapons protest, January 2022. (Source: ICAN France Facebook)

Yes, the UK has struggled to find a role since losing its empire, but it could now play a pivotal role for peace by becoming the first P5 member to break the habit of dependence on nuclear weapons. The UK arsenal is the smallest of the P5, and is deployed in only one system. If it were to announce it had decided to reject its doubly misnamed ‘independent deterrent,’ the US and UK anti-nuclear movements—and an overwhelming majority of world opinion—would erupt in support. In NATO, the UK would then wield unprecedented influence in leading the drive for a non-nuclear strategy, a process with the potential to heavily influence India, Pakistan and Israel, as well as others wanting to join the ‘nuclear club.’

Some political and military diehards argue that it is critical for the UK to retain its nuclear arsenal because ‘France must never be allowed to be the sole European nuclear power.’ However, what the real security needs of the British and all fellow Europeans demand is that the UK and France move on at last from the Napoleonic Wars and loss of empires. The ridiculous notion that France’s greatness depends on nuclear firepower is demeaning to French culture. The reality is that threatening nuclear weapon use risks the annihilation of that great culture within a devastated and poisoned land.

Sean Howard

 

Sean Howard is adjunct professor of political science at Cape Breton University and member of Peace Quest Cape Breton and the Canadian Pugwash Group. He may be reached here.